

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 223063

70

ORIGIN SS-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 (ISO) R

66617

DRAFTED BY: S/S-O:BO'GRADY

APPROVED BY: S/S-O:WNEWLIN

----- 105484

O 122159Z NOV 73 ZFF4

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 223063

EXDIS

FOLLOWING SENT ACTION STATE INFO NATO FROM THE HAGUE
NOVEMBER 9, REPEATED TO YOU:

QUOTE

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 4939

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, ENRG, XF, NL

SUBJECT: SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S NOVEMBER 7 MEETING WITH PRIME
MINISTER DEN UYL

1. SUMMARY: SECRETARY SCHLESINGER, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR GOULD
AND MEMBERS OF HIS PARTY, HAD AN EXTENDED MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER
DEN UYL ON NOVEMBER 7, AT DEN UYL'S INITIATIVE, TO DISCUSS THE MIDDLE
EAST SITUATION, PARTICULARLY THE RAMIFICATIONS OF THE ARAB OIL EM-
BARGO. DEN UYL WAS CRITICAL OF THE LATEST EC-9 ME DECLARATION AND
THE SECRETARY AGREED, SEEING IT AS AN ENTICEMENT TO FURTHER DIFFICUL-
TIES. THE SECRETARY WAS SYMPATHETIC TO THE DUTCH PLIGHT IN
THE FACE OF THE ARAB OIL EMBARGO AND SAID THAT SECRETARY
KISSINGER AND HE WERE AGREED
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 223063

THAT HOLLAND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO SUFFER FOR ITS VIRTUES. THEY
WERE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND US SUPPORT FOR HOLLAND WITH REGARD TO OIL
SUPPLIES, SUBJECT TO THE CONCURRENCE OF THE OTHER US GOVERNMENT
DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES CONCERNED AND TO THE FINAL DECISION

OF THE PRESIDENT. IN TALKING ABOUT THE OUTLOOK FOR THE MIDDLE EAST THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT INTEND TO BE DRIVEN TO THE WALL. HE SAID THAT WHILE A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE WOULD BE REQUIRED ON THE PART OF ISRAEL IT WAS ONLY THROUGH WASHINGTON THAT THE ARABS COULD TRULY ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT. THE SECRETARY CAREFULLY EXPLAINED THE REASONS WHY THE USG HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO DECLARE THE RECENT FORCES ALERT, EMPHASIZING THAT THE POLITICAL MAP OF THE WORLD WOULD HAVE BEEN CHANGED IF SOVIET FORCES HAD BEEN INTRODUCED INTO THE MIDDLE EAST. IN ANSWER TO DEN UYL'S PHILOSOPHIC INTROSPECTION ON EUROPE'S NEEDS AND AIMS TOWARD THE US THE SECRETARY REAFFIRMED US SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN UNITY AND SAID THAT WE COULD UNDERSTAND THAT ONE OF THE MOTIVES TOWARD THIS OBJECTIVE IS TO FREE EUROPE FROM DEPENDENCE ON THE US. THE SECRETARY ALSO ADDRESSED ANY POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS RE SECRETARY KISSINGER'S INITIATIVE TO STIMULATE AND FACILITATE THE TRANSITION OF THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE INTO A REVITALIZED US-EUROPEAN RELATIONSHIP, BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF PARTNERSHIP. END SUMMARY

2. AFTER A BRIEF EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, THE PRIME MINISTER STATED THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN TOO HAPPY WITH THE EC MEETING NOR THE POLICY STATEMENT. HE SAID THAT GON COULD NOT TAKE A SEPARATE STAND - "IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SUICIDE". AND THIS WAS TOO BAD FOR MORAL HOLLAND. THE COMMON MARKET COUNTRIES HAD DEMONSTRATED NO DESIRE TO HELP THE GON NOR DID THEY EXPRESS ANY SYMPATHY FOR ITS POSITION.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT ABOUT 15-20 PERCENT OF HOLLAND'S EXPORTS ARE IN DIFFERENT FORMS OF PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, AND IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE THESE EXPORTS THE DUTCH ECONOMY WILL BE SEVERELY DAMAGED. ABOUT 5-6 BILLION GUILDERS (\$2 TO 2.4 BILLION) OF CRUDE ARE IMPORTED EACH YEAR, HE CONTINUED, AND THE EXPORTS COME TO BETWEEN 15-20 BILLION GUILDERS (\$6 TO 8 BILLION) OBVIOUSLY AN RESTRICTION OF THIS TRADE WOULD CREATE ENORMOUS PROBLEMS FOR THE DUTCH ECONOMY. THE PRIME MINISTER THEN ASKED FOR ANY VIEWS WHICH THE SECRETARY MIGHT HAVE ON SECRETARY KISSINGER'S TRIP
SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 223063

TO THE MIDDLE EAST AND FOR THE SECDEF'S EVALUATION OF THE OVERALL SITUATION INCLUDING THE OUTLOOK FOR NEGOTIATIONS.

4. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE LAST THREE WEEKS WERE ILLUSTRATIVE OF WHY MAINTENANCE OF AN EFFECTIVE DEFENSE POSTURE OF THE EST IS NECESSARY TO THE CONTINUATION OF DETENTE. HE REEMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR A STRONG CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE AND EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS WOULD CONTINUE TO DO ITS DUTY IN THIS RESPECT IN THE FUTURE.

5. AS TO THE OIL SITUATION, THE UNITED STATES ADMIRES THE COURAGEOUS STAND OF THE GON. MORE THAN MERE ADMIRATION INDICATED,

HOWEVER, AND THE SECRETARY STATED THAT PRIOR TO HIS DEPARTURE FROM WASHINGTON HE HAD DISCUSSED THE EMBARGO OF HOLLAND WITH SECRETARY KISSINGER. THEY WERE AGREED THAT HOLLAND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO SUFFER FOR ITS VIRTUES. BOTH SECRETARIES WERE PREPARED TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SUPPORT HOLLAND WITH REGARD TO OIL SUPPLIES. THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WOULD HAVE TO CONCUR IN THIS RECOMMENDATION, AND, OF COURSE, THE PRESIDENT WOULD MAKE THE FINAL DECISION. THE SECRETARY HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT THE EC BY COMMON SUPPORT COULD FIRST RESOLVE THE ISSUE. HE ADDED THAT ANY US OIL SUPPLY SUPPORT WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT TO MEET HOLLAND'S RATHER THAN THE EC'S NEEDS.

6. THE UNITED STATES IS HOPEFUL, SECRETARY SCHLESINGER CONTINUED, FOR ACCOMMODATION ON THE OIL ISSUE AND A POLITICAL/MILITARY RESOLUTION

WHICH WILL NOT COMPROMISE ISRAELI SECURITY. THIS WILL REQUIRE A MORE FORTHCOMING ATTITUDE ON THE PART OF THE ISRAELIS WHO HAVE SUFFERED A DIPLOMATIC DEFEAT, ALTHOUGH THEY ACHIEVED MILITARY VICTORY. IN CONSEQUENCE ONLY THROUGH WASHINGTON CAN THE ARABS TRULY ACHIEVE A SETTLEMENT BECAUSE WE PRIMARILY ARE ABLE TO INFLUENCE ISRAEL. AT BEST THE OIL WEAPON WILL WORK ONLY ONCE, AND IT MAY IN FACT BOOMERANG UPON THE OIL PRODUCING STATES. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT THE UNITED STATES JUST DOES NOT INTEND TO BE DRIVEN TO THE WALL. DEN UYL ASKED HOW THE SECRETARY LOOKED ON THE EC DECLARATION. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE DECLARATION DID NOT CONTRIBUTE TO A SOLUTION, RATHER IT WAS AN ENTICEMENT FOR FURTHER DIFFICULTIES. THE US
SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 223063

COURSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST PROMISED SUCCESS. THE ARABS HAD TO COME TO WASHINGTON IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES BUT VISIBLE PANIC AMONG THE EUROPEANS MAY MISLEAD THE ARABS INTO BELIEVING THAT BLACKMAIL CAN SUCCEED. THIS ONLY WHETS THE APPETITE AND STRENGTHENS THE HANDS OF EXTREMISTS. THE EC NINE STATEMENT WAS PARTICULARLY UNHELPFUL BECAUSE IT APPEARED TO INDICATED THAT BLACKMAIL WAS SUCCEEDING. THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT THE DECLARATION MAY TEND TO MAKE THE ARABS INCREASE THEIR DEMANDS. THIS WAS ESSENTIALLY A PROBLEM CREATED BY THE FRENCH AND THE UK. THE POSITION OF GERMANY WAS MUCH MORE BALANCED.

7. DEN UYL THEN ASKED RHETORICALLY HOW ONE CAN EXPLAIN WHY THE LEFT-WING NETHERLANDS CABINET HAD TAKEN THIS POSITION. PERHAPS, HE SPECULATED, THE DUTCH ARE TOO MUCH THEOLOGIANS IN FOREIGN POLICY. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE DUTCH APPEAR CONSISTENT: IT WAS MORE IN CHARACTER FOR A SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT IN EUROPE TO SUPPORT SOCIALIST ISRAEL THAN EMBRACE THE KUWAITIS OR THE TRUCIAL SHEIKDOMS. WHEN DEN UYL ASKED IF THE DUTCH POSITION HAD SURPRISED THE US, THE SECRETARY SAID THAT OUR ONLY SURPRISE WAS AT THE EQUIVOCAL ROLE OF THE
UK - NOT AT THE FRENCH REACION. DEN UYL AGREED AND SAID THAT THE FRENCH AT LEAST WERE CONSISTENT; HOWEVER, HE, TOO, WAS SURPRISED AT

THE UK.

8. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID HE HAD OTHER PROBLEMS TO ADDRESS. THERE HAVE BEEN CRITICISMS IN HOLLAND ABOUT THE US DECLARATION OF ALERT. SOME ASK IF IT WAS A DOMESTIC MANEUVER; OTHERS THINK THE METHOD USED WAS TOO HEAVY AND TOO ROUGH. HE ASKED WHAT LED THE US GOVERNMENT TO TAKE THE ACTION, AND COMMENTED THAT AN ALERT CAN' BE USED TOO OFTEN BECAUSE OF THE DANGERS INVOLVED. WHEN YOU BRING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO ALERT, MANY PEOPLE THINK THE END OF THE WORLD IS BEGINNING.

9. THE SECRETARY REPLIED THAT THE POTENTIAL SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION REQUIRED SUCH ACTION. HE SAID THE POLITICAL MAP OF THE WORLD WOULD HAVE BEEN CHANGED IF SOVIET FORCES HAD BEEN INTRODUCED INTO THE MIDDLE EAST TO CHASTISE ISRAEL. IF SOVIET TROOPS HAD BEEN INTRODUCED IN WHATEVER GUISE, OIL SUPPLIERS WOULD HAVE BEEN MADE SUBJECT TO SOVIET PRESSURE AND AN ENORMOUS STRATEGIC VICTORY WOULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED BY THE SOVIETS.

SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 223063

10. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT THE ARGUMENT THAT DOMESTIC CONCERNS LED TO THE ALERT WAS ILLOGICAL. DR. KISSINGER HAD JUST RETURNED FROM MAKING A SETTLEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS. IT WOULD HAVE BEEN SENSELESS FOR THE US TO REJECT THIS SIGNIFICANT VISIBLE ACCOMPLISHMENT TO DECLARE AN ALERT. FURTHERMORE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL HAD ACTED WITHOUT CONCERN FOR THE DOMESTIC SITUATION. IN THIS CASE THE MOVE OF THE SOVIETS WAS FAR MORE SERIOUS THAN ANY SINCE 1962. IT WAS NECESSARY THAT EVERYONE UNDERSTAND THAT WE WERE PREPARED TO USE FORCE. A NUCLEAR ALERT BY EITHER SIDE WAS NOT IN THE CARDS. WE HAD NO INTENT OF ATTACKING RUSSIA AND WE HAD NO EXPECTATION THAT THEY WOULD ATTACK THE US. THE ALERT TO DEFENSE CONDITION THREE WAS A MODERATE MOVE TO SHOW THE SERIOUSNESS OF UNITED STATES CONCERN AND TO MAKE PLAIN THAT THE US COULD REACT IF NECESSARY.

11. DEN UYL AGREED TO THE SECRETARY'S COMMENT THAT UNITY OF THE WEST IS IMPRTANT, ADDING THAT THIS UNITY IS THREATENED IN MANY WAYS INCLUDING IN THE MIDDLE AST. PERHAPS IT IS GOOD THAT THE US AND THE NETHERLANDS CURRENTLY FIND THEMSELVES IN A SIMILAR POSITION HE WENT ON TO SAY THAT THERE HAS BEEN CRITICISM IN HOLLAND OF THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD LEADER AND MUCH ANTI-AMERICANISM IN EUROPE AND IN ALL PARTIES. THE TREND IN EUROPE FOR UNITY AND UNIFIED FOREIGN POLICY IS FED IN PART BY ITS DESIRE TO BECOME INDEPENDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. HE POINTED OUT THAT WHILE HOLLAND HAS A TRADITION OF DEFENDING ATLANTIC SOLIDARITY HE HAD TO ADMIT THAT HIS UPPORT AND THAT OF OTHER GROUPS FOR ATLANTIC UNITY WAS UNDER STRESS. THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION HAD CREATED A PECULIAR POSITION FOR HSI CABINET AND GOVERNMENT. HE SAID HE BELONGED TO THOSE WHO IN THE 1950'S HAD FELT STRONG TIES TO THE US BUT VIET NAM HAD AFFECTED HIM AND HIS PERSONAL

CHANGE IN ATTITUDE REFLECTED THE CHANGE IN DUTCH PUBLIC OPINION TOWARDS US THAT BEGAN IN THE LATE 1960'S.

12. DEN UYL SAID THAT DR. KISSINGER'S APRIL SPEECH FELL UPON MIXED AND FRUSTRATED FEELINGS IN EUROPE. THE PRESENT NETHERLANDS POLICY IS AMBIVALENT TOWARDS THE US. THE GON IS CONVINCED ON THE ONE HAND OF THE NEED FOR A MORE INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN POLICY AND POSITION, YET KNOWS ON THE OTHER THAT IT MUST STILL DEPEND ON THE US FOR MILITARY SECURITY.

SECRET

PAGE 06 STATE 223063

13. FURTHER MORE DEN UYL THOUGHT THAT DR. KISSINGER DOES NOT SUFFICIENTLY DISCERN THE VARIOUS MOTIVES WHICH GOVERN EUROPEAN PLICIES. DEN UYL RS FULLY CONVINED THAT THERE MUST BE UNITY BETWEEN EUROPE AND THE US ON SECURITY MATTERS IN ORDER TO PREVENT SOVIET ADVENTURISM. AT THE SAME TIME, MILITARY UNITY CAN ONLY BE MAINTAINED IF THERE IS MORE UNDERSTANDING BY THE US OF THE MOTIVES THAT LEAD EUROPEAN NATIONS, INCLUDING NON-NATO COUNTRIES LIKE SWEDEN TO TAKE INDEPENDENT POSITIONS TOWARD THE US. THERE HAS BEEN A TENDECNY FOR EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS TO MOVE TO THE LEFT. HE SAID HE WAS NOT SURE THAT THE IMPLICATIONS OF THIS BROAD MOVEMENT BY EUROPEANS IF FULLY UNDERSTOOD IN AMERICA.

14. THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE US SUPPORTS THE UNIFICATION OF EUROPE. HE RECOGNIZES THAT ONE OF THE FORCES BEHIND UNIFICATION IS THE DESIRE TO FREE EUROPE FROM DEPENDENCE ON THE US. HE SAID THIS MOTIVE WAS QUITE ACCEPTABLE IF IT ACTUALLY LEDS TOWARD UNIFCATION OF EUROPE. BUT MERE CARPING AT US IS NOT PRODUCTIVE. THE AMBIVALENCE OF THE GON, HE WENT ON TO SAY, IS NOT SURPRISING. THE ENTHUSIASM OF THE DUTCH COULD NOT BE SUSTAINED. THEY WERE WILLING TO OVERLOOK US DIFICIENCIES, WHILE THE YOUNGER GENERATION IS SKEPTICAL OF THAT WHICH THEIR ELDERS DISREGARD. IF IS FLATTERING TO THE US TO BE HELD IN SUCH HIGH ESTEEM, BUT IT IS NOT NECESSARILY MERITED NOR REALISTIC.

15. SECDEF SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO CLARIFY TWO POINTS. FIRST, DR. KISSINGER'S EFFORTS APPAR TO BE MISUNDERSTOOD. KISSINGER RECOGNIZES CHANGES ARE UNDERWAY IN EUROPE AND THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND EUROPE HAS TO CHANGE. HE ALSO WANTS TO MAKE THAT TRANSITION TO A NEW STATUS, BUT IN DONING SO HE WANTS TO RETAIN THOSE ELEMENTS FROM THE OLD THAT ARE NECESSARY FOR THE FUTURE WITHOUT BLOCKING DESIRABLE CHANGES.

16. THE SECOND POINT IS THAT OUR VIET NAM POLICY DID NOT MEET WITH INIVERSAL ADMIRATION IN THE US, EITHER. THERE WERE INDEED GRET ELEMENTS OF TRAGEDY IN THE SOUTH EAST ASIAN SITUATION. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD BE RECOGNIZED THAT US LOYALTY AND STEADFASTNESS TO THE SVN GOVERNMENT IS AN INDICATION THAT THE US IS PREPARED TO BE STEADFAST IN ITS EUROPEAN COMMITMENTS AS WELL. EUROPE SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT THE US HAS OBLIGATIONS AND POLICIES

ELSEWHERE IN THE WORLD. WE BELIEVE THAT THE
SECRET

PAGE 07 STATE 223063

EUROPEANS SHOULD BE CAPABLE OF CRITICIZING OTHER US POLICIES,
SHOULD THEY BE SO INCLINED, WITHOUT ATTACKING OR TRANSATLANTIC
PARTNERSHIP. DR. KISSINGER IS SAYING THAT THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE
REMAINS IMPORTANT DESPITE DETENTE AND INDEPENDENT EUROPEAN VIEWS.
SECRETARY CONCLUDED THAT IT IS PARTICULARLY DIFFICULT TO UNDERSTAND
WHY THERE IS OBJECTION TO THE TERM QUOTE PARTNERSHIP UNQUOTE.
THE EUROPEANS EXPECT THE US TO GO TO NUCLEAR WAR TO PROTECT
THEM, YET THEY ARE UNWILLING TO EMPLOY THE TERM QUOTE PARTNERSHIP
UNQUOTE TO DESCRIBE SUCH A FUNDAMENTAL RELATIONSHIP.

17. SECRETARY SCHLESINGER APPROVED TRANSMISSION OF THIS MESSAGE
TO WASHINGTON ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT REVIEW THE TEXT PRIOR TO
HIS DEPARTURE FROM THE HAGUE. GOULD

UNQUOTE RUSH

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 11 MAY 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PRIME MINISTER, AGREEMENTS, FOREIGN RELATIONS, PETROLEUM, MEETINGS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, EMBARGOES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 NOV 1973
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: garlanwa
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1973STATE223063
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: S/S-O:BO'GRADY
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: P750026-0609
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1973/newtext/t19731167/abqcejtz.tel
Line Count: 293
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: garlanwa
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 JUL 2001
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <31-Jul-2001 by boyleja>; APPROVED <24-Sep-2001 by garlanwa>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SECRETARY SCHLESINGER'S NOVEMBER 7 MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER DEN UYL
TAGS: PFOR, ENRG, US, NL, XF, EEC, (SCHLESINGER), (UYL, DEN)
To: BONN NIACT
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005